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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEEHIVE SECURITY THRIFT \ 
& LOAN, a Utah corporation, \ 
Plaintiff and Appellant) 
vs. 
JOHN T. HYDE and ~I1-\.RY C. \ 
HYDE, his wife, KERMIT R. ( 
ESI(ELSON, L . .t\.RSON PAINT- 1) 
ING c,OMPANY, and UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendants and Respondents. i 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
10232 
STATEMEN'f OF 'l"'HE 1\:IND 01~ CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to declare a promissory 
note in default and foreclose a mortgage. Defendants, 
Kermit R. Eskelson and John 'f. Hyde, counterclaimed 
asserting the loan was usurious. 
3 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At pretrial,~ the Honorable A. H. Ellett ruled as 
a matter of law that the pro1nissory note in favor of 
appellant, Beehive Security 'l'hrift & Loan, violated the 
usury laws of the State of Utah and, that the mortgage 
note and mortgage are in default and entitled to be 
closed. 
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order granting 
respondents' counterclaim that the note is usurious. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Beehive Security Thrift and Loan, a 
Utah corporation, is a licensed industrial loan corpo-
ration. On or about April 18, 1961, John T. Hyde 
and Kermit R. Eskelson executed and delivered to 
Beehive Security Company, now known as Beehive 
Security Thirft and Loan, a mortgage note, and J olu1 
T. Hyde and Mary C. Hyde executed and delivered 
a real estate mortgage to secure the payment of said 
mortgage note. The note was in the principal amount 
of $7,128.00, representing cash loaned of $5,000.00, 
life insurance of $484.71, recording fees of $20.00 and 
a setting up charge of $1,603.29. 
This action was commenced by Beehive Security 
Thrift and Loan to foreclose on its note and mortgage 
executed by Eskelson and the Hydes. 
4 
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Payments totaling $694.00 were made: by John 
'f. Hyde, after which he defaulted on the loan. 
The Honorable A. H. Ellett, at pretrial, ruled 
as a matter of law that the loan was usurious; and, 
that interest may not be charged by an industrial loan 
company on a loan in excess of $5,000.00. The trial 
court determined that of the total sum paid, $539.24· 
should be credited as principal, and the balance to 
interest, resulting in a tripled amount of $464.28. 
Attorney fees were assessed against appellant in the 
sum of $141.00, resultir1g in a net set-off of $1,144.52, 
and judgment of $3,855.48. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. AN INDUSTRIAL LOAN COM-
pANY CAN CHARGE INTEREST ON A LOAN 
IN EXCESS OF $5,000.00. 
Interest charges for industrial loan corporations 
are regulated by Section 15-1-2 and Chapter 8, Title 
7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provide as fol-
lows: 
Section 15-1-2: 
"The parties to any contract may agree in 
writing for the payment of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods or things in 
action, not to exceed ten percent per annum~ 
provided: 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"(f) 'That industrial loan corporations may 
contract for and receive interest and charges at 
the rates subject to the limitations contained in 
Chapter 8, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953;" 
Section 7-8-3 : 
''Every industrial loan corporation shall have 
power: 
* * * * 
"(b) To charge interest for the full term of the 
loan computed on the original amount of the loan 
(excluding charges) at the rate of 1% or less 
per month on that part of the loan note in excess 
of $2,000.00 and at the rate of 3;4 of 1% per 
month or' less on that part of the loan in excess 
of $2,000.00, but not in excess of $5,000.00, with-
out regard to any requirement for installment 
payments, (subject to the refund for prepayment 
in full as set forth in paragraph d) . " 
The issue presented by this appeal is a question 
of fir~t impression with this Court. Moreover, the 
issue has never been decided by any court. 
As a basic premise, it would seem that there is 
no question but what an industrial loan corporation 
may loan in excess of $5,000.00 to any one person. 
The only restriction as to the a1nount of loans to any 
one person is contained in Section 7-8-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows: 
"No such corporation shall: 
* * * * 
'~ (2}. Hold at any one time the obligation or 
obligations of any one person aggregating more 
6 
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than five precent of the amount of its paid up 
capital and surplus." 
Since the Utah Code permits an industrial loan 
company to lend in excess of $5,000.00 to any one 
person ,the issue is squarely, Can the industrial loa11 
corporation collect interest on that portion of the loan 
in excess of $5,000.00? 
The code provision, Section 15-1-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, sets the maximum interest rate which 
may be charged by lenders generally, and in addition 
permits a greater rate to be charged by industrial 
loan corporations. Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, permits the industrial loan corporation higher 
rates up to $5"000.00, but in no way purports to deny 
interest to lenders who loan in excess of $5,000.00 to 
any one person. 
This question has been presented to the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, and an opinoin was 
expressed by his office to the effect that a loan could 
be made in excess of $5,000.00 and interest at the maxi-
mum legal rate as provided in Section 15-1-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, could be charged on the amount 
in excess of $5,000.00. 'rhe applicable portion of the 
opinion is as follows: 
"We are of the opinion that the foregoing· 
statute does not establish a Hutxitnum loan which 
may be made by an industrial loan corporation .. 
but rather fixes the maximurn rate of interest 
which may be charged on loans not in excess of 
7 
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$5,000.00 and parts thereof. Section 15-1-2, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in part: 
"The parties to any contract may agree in 
writing for the payment of interest for the loan 
or for forbearance of any money, goods or 
things in action, not to exceed ten per cent per 
annum; _provided: 
* * * * 
(f) That industrial loan corporations may 
contract for and receive interest and charges 
at the rates subject to the limitations contained 
in Chapter 8, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. * * * " (Emphasis added.) 
"It follows from the foregoing statute that 
any party, including an industrial loan corpo-
ration, may charge the legal rate of interest 
provided in Section 15-1-2, supra, on any loan 
without regard as to amount. We conclude that 
an industrial loan corporation may charge the 
interest rate permitted in Section 7-8-3, supra, 
for loans not in excess of $5,000.00, and the legal 
rate of interest authorized under Section 15-1-2 
for that part of a loan in excess thereof. 
"Persuasive in reaching this conclusion is the 
legislative treatment of small loan corporations 
and the limitations imposed thereon as to the 
amount of the loans and interest charged. Sec-
tion 7-10-lB(a), U.C.A. 1953, as a1nended, pro-
vides as follows : 
' (a) Every licensee qualified under this act 
may contract for and receive, on any loan of 
money not exceeding $600.00 in amount, 
charges at a rate not exceeding 3% per month 
on that part of the unpaid principal balance 
8 
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not in excess of $300.00 and at a rate: of 1% 
per month on that part of the unpaid principal 
balance in excess of $300.00 but not in excess 
of $600.00 * * * ' 
"Section 7-10-15, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
provides in part : 
'If any licensee shall loan or contract for 
the loan of an a1nount in excess of $600.00 to 
any one borrower, whether as a part of one 
transaction or as the aggregate of more than 
one transaction, he shall not be permitted to 
charge, contract for, or receive, either directly 
or indirectly, upon any such loan or aggregate 
of such loans, or upon any part thereof, in-
terest in excess of that which he would be per-
mitted by la'v to charge if he were not licensed 
hereunder. * * * ' 
"In view of the foregoing authority, we reaso11 
that had the Legislature intended to limit indus-
trial corporations to a maximum loan an1ount, or 
had the Legislature intended that for loans in 
excess of $5,000.00 the industrial loan corpora-
tion could not take advantage of the greater 
rate permitted under Section 7-8-3, express pro-
vision would have been made therefor. Under 
the Small Loan Act the Legislature did not re-
strict the small loan corporation from making 
loans in excess of a specific amount, but rather 
expressly provided for a lower interest rate on 
the entire loan in the event the loan exceeded a 
$600.00 maximum. 
"Since the legislature did not so expressly 
provide in the case of an industrial loan corpo-
ration, we hesitate to apply any generous inter-
pretations to that effect and would, therefore, 
9 
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conclude that in the event an industrial loan cor-
poration makes a loan in excess of $5,000.00, it 
may charge the rate of interest provided in Sec-
tion 7-8-3, supra, on the amounts not in excess 
of $5,000.00, and on that part of the loan in excess 
of $5,000.00, the industrial loan corporation may 
charge that rate of interest which would be per-
mitted by law if it were not licensed as an in-
dustrial loan corporation. 
"Of course, the amount of any loan is limited 
by Section 7-8-5 ( 2) , which prohibits any indus-
trial loan corporation from holding at any one 
time an obligation or obligations of any one 
person aggregating more than five percent of 
the amount of its paid up capital and surplus." 
This court, in discussing statutory construction and 
the manner in which usury statutes should be inter-
preted, said in Cobb v. Hartenstein~ 47 Utah 147, 152 
P. 424: 
"Since usury laws are quasi-penal, the courts 
will not hold a contract to be in violation of the 
usury laws, unless upon a fair a11d reasonable 
construction of all its terms, in view of the deal-
ings of the parties, it is manifest that the intent 
of the parties was to engage in such a transaction 
as is forbidden by those laws. If two reasonable 
constructions are possible, by one of which the 
contract will be legal and valid, while by the 
other it will be usurious and invalid, the court 
will always adopt the for1ner. In sho1·t, the gene-
ral rule of interpretation and construction of 
contracts may be said to be that the contract is 
not usurious when it may be explained on a11y 
other hypothesis." 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT 2. THE LENDER CAN ALLO'l~ 
PAYMEN'fS TO PRINCIPAL AND THERE 
IS NO INTERES'l, PAID WHICH CAN BE 
TREBLED. 
Section 15-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
permits the recovery of interest paid is as follows: 
'' * * * In case the greater rate of interest has 
been paid the person by whom it has been paid 
or his legal representative, Inay recover back 
three times the an1ount of the interest thus paid 
from the receiver or taker thereof and reasonable 
attorneys fees, * * * '' 
From a careful reading of the statute, it is evident 
that usurious interest must be paid by the borrower 
before any penalty can be recovered. 
In the case of McBroom v. Scottish Mortgage and 
Land Investment Company~ 153 U.S. 318, 38 L. Ed. 
729, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 852, the Supreme Court was 
called upon to interpret a New Mexico statute which 
provided that the collection of interest at a higher 
rate than 12% was a misdemeanor and which permitted 
the collection and recovery of double the amount so 
collected or received upon any action brought for the 
recovery of the same. After the first payment was made, 
the borrower brought his suit to recover under the 
statute. In discussing the statute, the court said: 
"By the statute of N e"' Mexico it is provided 
that 'In written contracts for the payment of 
money it shall not be legal to recover more tha.n 
12% interest per annum;' that 'any person, per-
11 
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sons or corporation who shall hereafter charge, 
collect or receive from any person a higher rate 
of interest than 12 per cent per annum shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor * * *; and such person, 
persons, or corporations shall forfeit to the per-
so"n of whom such interest was collected or re-
ceived, or his executors, administrators, or as-
signs, double the amount so collected or received 
upon any action brought for the recovery of 
the same * * *.' Our conclusion upon this branch 
of the case is that, upon principal and authority, 
the contract of loan, in question, providing for 
usurious interest cannot be held void except as 
to the interest in excess of what the statute al-
lowed to be charged, collected or received. 
"The contract of loan not being void, except 
as to the excess of interest stipulated to be paid, 
the question arises whether the lender is liable to 
an action for the penalty prescribed by the 
statute so long as the principal debt, with legal 
interest thereon, after deducing all payments, 
is unpaid. We are of the opinion that this ques-
tion must be answered in the negative. \Vhile, 
under the statute, the n1ere charging of usurious 
interest may be a misdemeanor for which the 
lender can be fined, whether such usurious in-
terest is or is not collected or received, the bor-
rower has no cause of action until usurious inter-
est has been actua~ly collected or received from 
him. Such is the Inandate of the statute. And 
interest cannot be said to have been collected 
or received, in excess of what may be lawfully 
collected and received, until the lender has, in 
fact-after giving credit for all payinents--col-
lected or received more than the sum loaned 
with legal interest." ' 
12 
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It is submitted that no interest has been paid by 
respondents because the entire principal of the loan 
has not been repaid. 
POINT 3. THE TIME IN WHICH THE 
AC'fiON FOR RECO-VERY OF USURIOUS 
INTEREST HAS LAPSED CAUSING RE-
SPONDEN'l,'S COUN'l.,ERCLAIM '1.,0 BE 
BARRED. 
Section 15-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
permits the recovery of interest paid provides as follo,vs: 
" * * * In case the greater rate of interest has 
been paid the person by 'vhom it has been paid, 
or his legal representatives, may recover back 
three times the amount of the interest thus paid 
from the receiver or taker therereof and reason-
able attorney fees, provided that such action is 
commenced within two years from the time the 
usurious transactio,n occurred:'-' (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
In the event the Court finds that the note is usurious 
and that interest has been paid, it is asserted that statu-
tory period in which the action may be brought had 
expired. The original transaction between appellant 
and respondent occurred on Aprill8, 1961. Respondent 
Kermit R. Eskelson, filed an answer asserting usury 
on February 21, 1963; however, he is not entitled to 
this defense because it must be asserted by one who has 
paid the interest or his legal representative. The answer 
filed by the Hydes was not filed until January 21, 1964, 
13 
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at which time the statutory two-year period had expired. relativ 
The time period set out in the statute should be strictly effecti1 
construed, because the cause of action is created by 
statute. Treating with this matter is a statement from 
34 Am. Jur.~ Limitation of Actions~ §7: 
"A statute of limitations should be differen- It 
tiated from conditions which are annexed to a erred i 
right of action created by statute. A statute which · 
in itself creates a new liability, gives an action ~rab£ 
to enforce it unknown to the common law, and ~rtioi 
fixes the time within which that action may be ~de 
commenced, is not a statute of limitations. It daiml 
is a statute of creation, and the commencement 
of the action within the time it fixes is an indis-
pensable condition of the liability and . of the 
action which it permits. The time element is an 
inherent element of the right so created, and the 
limitation of the remedy is a limitation of the 
right. Such a provision will control, no matter 
in what form the action is brought. The statute 
is an offer of an action on condition that it be 
commenced within the specified time. If the offer 
is not accepted in the only way in which it can 
be accepted, by a commencement of the action 
within the specified time, the action and the right 
of action no longer exist, and the defendant is 
exempt from liability." 
If the Court finds that an allocation can be made 
between principal and interest, then it necessarily ,Yould 
follow that the time in which "such action is comme11ced" 
must commence on the date the transaction is entered 
into and expire two years hence. Accordingly, assuming 
arguendo only, the correctness of the trial court's rulina 
0 
14 
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relative to the issue of usury, the respondents Hyde 
effectively are barred from asserting their counterclain1. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
erred in ruling that appellant, an industrial loan cor-
poration, is barred from charging interest upon the 
portion of a loan exceeding $5,000.00, and that re-
spondents Hyde were not barred from asserting the 
claim of usury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM G. FOWLER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellant 
340 East Fourth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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